Only if observed physics is in fact a simulation. That’s an extraordinary proposition requiring extraordinary evidence, evidence which the proposition places in doubt. If we’re not in a simulation, the problem is moot. Since it’s a hypothesis we can never prove and a difference that makes no difference - if we are in one we aren’t getting out it - the logical course of action as physicists and cosmologists is to treat it as a metaphysical and in some cases theological question, not as a useful explanation for experimental results.
Others are of course free to do otherwise, but I’m not merely skeptical of the veracity of the hypothesis, as a theorist I’m skeptical of its experimental utility.
Methodologically perhaps, but if you’re own hypothesis requires distrust of the empirical results, not to mention the other possible explanations for those results that don’t require a self-defeating explanation, to what end?
I’d argue that experiments in the sensory world to test a hypothesis that says the sensory world is a simulation are not experiments that test the simulation hypothesis. So yes, you’re doing empiricism when you design and run experiments, but you’re not testing the simulation hypothesis anymore than you’re testing the existence of God, even though when you get back results you don’t have another explanation for you can blame God or Simulators. That doesn’t make them bad experiments. That makes the Simulation Hypothesis an empirically useless explanation.
In a manner of speaking, couldn’t you call the observed Newtonian force of “gravity” a “simulation” generated by more nuanced forces than Newton was aware of?
The biggest problem with this discussion is one of semantics — the notion of “simulation” can be interpreted in many ways. For instance, I’d argue that we’ve already proven that our notion of physical realty IS a simulation — I mean, my but is something like 99.9999% empty space, and so is the chair it’s sitting on, and yet we are coaxed into thinking of them as entirely “physical” objects.
That depends on the flavor of simulation hypothesis that you are testing. If your hypothesis is a non- interventionist simulation that does not include “miracles”, then Chalmers’ objection does not apply. There is then no essential difference between probing for evidence of artifice, and inspecting the cosmic background for evidence of bubble-wall collisions. I would not tell the cosmologists doing the latter that they are doing metaphysics.
