Electronic voting machines suck, the comprehensive 2016 election edition

1: Computers aren’t trustworthy, as such for those other transactions.

Surely you realize that very nearly 100% of the world’s financial transactions - especially among companies, banks, and governments - are conducted electronically, specifically because it is the most secure model that we have for these types of transactions.

Banks don’t feel compelled to keep a paper trail as a backup to their vastly complex financial records, nor to resort to caveman forms of exchange like gold ingots.

Yet, somehow, the global economy manages not to collapse due to rampant banking fraud. In the financial sector, the most grievous forms of electronic theft that thieves manage to pull off is penny-ante stuff - like the gang of 100+ people who knocked over a bunch of ATMs and managed to net $13 million., which in the global market is like pocket change.

You cannot look at the world banking model, in which purely electronic systems manage to achieve nearly-impervious security against the most motivated hackers imaginable - and then turn around and look at voting and say, “oh, we can’t use electronic machines for voting because they’re unsecure.” There is a vast disconnect in that reasoning that you’ll need to explain.

All of the E2E auditable voting systems endorsed by cryptographers have a paper component.

Much like all of the first electronic banking systems were backed by paper records. They aren’t any more, because when the systems are developed enough to achieve a certain high level of confidence, paper is useless.

But we’re not actually getting there with paper, because too many people are content to settle for the hopelessly vulnerable paper ballot system we have today. The luddites are winning, and the victim is our democratic process.