I’m pretty much done here because we’re retreading ground, and you’re continuing with namecalling, which suggests that you’ve made up your mind and are interested in winning, not discussing.
Some quick points:
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“Something would have” replaced DRM, “guaranteed.” Except, as I explain upstream, this is nearly impossible without a standards body to paper over antitrust. Nothing replaced music DRM.
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Flash in a sandbox is better than Flash without a sandbox: neither is good if it’s illegal to report vulns.
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EME isn’t covered under 1201: anyone who asserts this as fact is either underinformed or choosing to recklessly oversimplify. As I explained in detail above, 1201 has analogs all over the world with differing contours that have never been cataloged; in the US, leading 1201 experts disagree with you; the firms involved have acted as though EME has 1201 coverage; the W3C has also done so (creating guidelines that would be pointless if 1201 didn’t confer a right to censor security disclosures) and the W3C’s chief strategist, a widely respected cyberlawyer, disagrees with you. You can keep asserting that 1201 doesn’t cover EME, but if you don’t engage with these arguments, I have nothing further to say on the subject.
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The fact that 1201 is being increasingly invoked is, in fact, germane to a discussion of whether standardizing 1201-covered technologies presents a risk of it being invoked over them. Saying “nope” isn’t meaningful engagement with that argument.
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There are already international rules governing the trade in weaponized 0-days and other vulns, which EFF has been very engaged with (google “wassenar”).
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Limitations on the disclosure of vulns – like the ones the W3C is creating – is beneficial to the cyber-arms trade, because that trade relies upon longevity in its vulns, and that longevity is best combatted with rapid disclosure
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The W3C’s guidelines implicitly AND explicitly acknowledge that EME creates risk for security researchers – and then sets out the normative terms under which the organization believes it would be legitimate to exploit the legal oddity in order to silence researchers.
But that’s it, I’m done. At this point, I’ve engaged with you thoroughly, and without namecalling, in more than one thread, and in return I’ve got personal attacks, defensive subject-changing, and a lack of substantive engagement.
I’m relatively certain that you’ll be back for more as this fight goes on.
But I’ve got 50-some W3C members who are ready to vote to block EME, and I’m going to continue to campaign against the best-funded, largest, most litigation-happy companies in the tech and entertainment world while you stick up for their right to sue security researchers, tell people not to support EFF’s work, and blithely dismiss the concerns of hundreds of security researchers, legal experts, the Royal National Institute for Blind People, Vision Australia, Lawrence Livermore Labs, Oxford, Eindhoven, and the German National Library.