The last part of this chapter focuses on what he calls the “Ricardian equivalence”, which is about public debt, and how that period of growth in GB and France saw the state carrying debt the whole time. So does public debt make economic growth in part possible, because debt means the state can nudge the private sector along more effectively? He mentions that public debt is owned by a small portion, presumable the top who can afford to buy public debt, and dispropotionately benefit from such? this is 134-35 that I’m talking about.
He also indicates that at a time when the pervailing thought seemed to focus on ending the “liberal consensus” as it’s known, and deregulating the market, that France was going against the grain, and expanding the public sector’s role in the economy… but they eventually got on board, even with a socialist government.
Either way, both countries had a similar trajectory. he indicates the role of “foreign capital” in relation to their empires of the 19th/20th century… Why not a comparision to a country without vast overseas empires (Germany?)or other kinds of empires (US?). Why does he find GB and France to normanative in this case?
And this line, “Every country has its own history, of course, and its own political timetable” (139), is he suggesting there is a logical conclusion that was inevitable after the constant growth?