Indigenous tribes fronting for patent trolls sue Apple

[Paul_Jones1]

thechuck_2112 https://bbs.boingboing.net/u/thechuck_2112 : By all means,
reply…simply provide the U.S. Constitutional source for the passage of
Title 25-INDIANS…begin with the Statutes as Large. While you are
searching for the Statutes at Large showing the Constitutional source for
the passage of Title 25-INDIANS, read this letter by Hon. Cong. Roy
Fitzgerald on the topic:
Passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924 is the ‘…rebuttable
presumption as variance with the Code…’ referred-to in Fitzgerald’s
letter.

Notes on Statute Law
by Walter Kenaston
through the grace of IAUE Aleim (the Lord God)

United States Code

The U. S. Code is not law, and has no meaning outside the “courts,
tribunals, and public offices of the United States, at home or abroad, of
the District of Columbia, and of each State, Territory, or insular
possession of the United States”, even if “positive law.” According to the
law enacting the original U. S. Code (44 Stat.), no new law is enacted or
amended by revision of the U. S. Code. Subject matter jurisdiction can be
challenged if a charge is brought only citing the U. S. Code, and not a
real law behind the code.

Preface to Volume 44 of the Statutes At Large (which first adopted the
present U. S. Code)

P R E F A C E

This Code is the official restatment in convenient form of the general
and permanent laws of the United States in force December 7, 1925, now
scattered in 25 volumes–i. e., the Revised Statutes of 1878, and volumes
20 to 43, inclusive, of the Statutes at Large. No new law is enacted and
no law repealed. It is prima facie the law. It is presumed to be the
law. The presumption is rebuttable by production of prior unrepealed Acts
of Congress at variance with the Code. Because of such possibility of error
in the Code and of appeal to the Revised Statutes and Statutes at Large, a
table of statutes repealed prior to December 7, 1925, is published herein
together with the Articles of Confederation; The Declaration of
Independence; Ordinance of 1787; the Constitution with amendments and
index; tables of cross references to the Revised Statutes, the Statutes at
Large, the United States Compiled Statutes, Anotated, of the West
Publishing Co., and the Federal Statutes, Annotated, of Edward Thompson
Co.; an appendix with the general and permanent laws of the first session
of the Sixty-ninth Congress; and finally an exhaustive index of the laws in
the Code and appendix.
The first official codification of the general and permanent laws of the
United States was made in 1874 and followed by a perfected edition in
1878. From 1897 to 1907 a commission was engaged in an effort to codify
the great mass of accumulating legislation. The work of the commission
involved an expenditure of over $300,000, but was never carried to
completion. More recently the task of codification was undertaken by the
late Hon. Edward C. Little as chairman of the Committee on the Revision of
the Laws of the House of Representatives, who labored indefatigably from
1919 to the day of his death, June 24, 1924. The volumes which represented
the result of his labors were embodied in bills which passed the Hose of
Representatives in three successive Congresses unanimously but failed of
action in the Senate.

---

Scrutiny of this Code is invited. Constructive criticism is solicited.
It is the ambition of the Committee on the Revision of the Laws of the
House of Representatives gradually to perfect the Code by correcting
errors, eliminating obsolete matter, and restating the law with logical
comleteness and with precision, brevity, and uniformity of expression.
Address criticisms to Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the
Laws of the House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
WASHINGTON, June 30, 1926

ROY G. FITZGERALD, Chairman.

[Paul_Jones1]

jerwin: Your post of the article by Harvard…the article fails to address this single Constitutional core issue: “Where in the United States Constitution is the authority to prove their essay post passage of the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924?”

The Harvard article fails to provide any Amendments to the Constitution to make the health, welfare, safety and benefits of a select group of U.S./State citizens with “Indian ancestry/race” distinguishable from all other non-Indian U.S./State citizens because of their “Indian ancestry/race!” In short, the United States Constitution itself debunks the Harvard article beginning with the 14th Amendment’s ‘equal protection’ clause.

This SCOTUS decision also debunks Harvard’s article:
United States Supreme Court
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, (1995) No. 93-1841 Argued: January 17, 1995 Decided: June 12, 1995:
JUSTICE SCALIA, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I join the opinion of the Court, except Part III-C, and except insofar as it may be inconsistent with the following: In my view, government can never have a “compelling interest” in discriminating on the basis of race in order to “make up” for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Individuals who have been wronged by unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race. That concept is alien to the Constitution’s focus upon the individual, see Amdt. 14, 1 ("[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person" the equal protection of the laws) (emphasis added), and its rejection of dispositions based on race, see Amdt. 15, 1 (prohibiting abridgment of the right to vote “on account of race”) or based on blood, see Art. III, 3 ("[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood"); Art. I, 9 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States”). To pursue the concept of racial entitlement - even for the most admirable and benign of purposes - is to reinforce and preserve for future [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.
It is unlikely, if not impossible, that the challenged program would survive under this understanding of strict scrutiny, but I am content to leave that to be decided on remand. [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 1]
JUSTICE THOMAS, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to all government classifications based on race. I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the premise underlying JUSTICE STEVENS’ and JUSTICE GINSBURG’S dissents: that there is a racial paternalism exception to the principle of equal protection. I believe that there is a “moral [and] constitutional equivalence,” post, at 3, (STEVENS, J., dissenting), between laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race in order to foster some current notion of equality. Government cannot make us equal; it can only recognize, respect, and protect us as equal before the law.
That these programs may have been motivated, in part, by good intentions cannot provide refuge from the principle that under our Constitution, the government may not make distinctions on the basis of race. As far as the Constitution is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government’s racial classifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged. There can be no doubt that the paternalism that [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 2] appears to lie at the heart of this program is at war with the principle of inherent equality that underlies and infuses our Constitution. See Declaration of Independence (“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness”).
These programs not only raise grave constitutional questions, they also undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle. Purchased at the price of immeasurable human suffering, the equal protection principle reflects our Nation’s understanding that such classifications ultimately have a destructive impact on the individual and our society. Unquestionably, “[i]nvidious [racial] discrimination is an engine of oppression,” post, at 3. It is also true that “[r]emedial” racial preferences may reflect “a desire to foster equality in society,” ibid. But there can be no doubt that racial paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as any other form of discrimination. So-called “benign” discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are “entitled” to preferences. Indeed, JUSTICE STEVENS once recognized the real harms stemming from seemingly “benign” discrimination. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 545 (1980) (STEVENS, J., dissenting) (noting that “remedial” race legislation “is perceived by many as resting on an assumption that those who are granted this special [ ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC. v. PENA, ___ U.S. ___ (1995) , 3] preference are less qualified in some respect that is identified purely by their race”).
In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. * In each instance, it is racial discrimination, plain and simple.

Nice try though.

[anotherone]

Sounds great but how can a nation sign away their sovereignty? I mean, let’s say the tribe breaks the contract, who can Allergan sue for relief?