Same combo since 2000
Look how easy it is to inspect packages that don’t have one of these. Easier.
I don’t even want to think about how many disgruntled employees have been laid off (with that knowledge) since then.
From the amazon link posted above:
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PROTECT AGAINST DAMAGE & THEFT: This container is constructed from reinforced, double-strength aluminum alloy built to withstand powerful blows and thwart tampering.
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A NECESSARY SAFEGUARD: Outfitted with a DVA-L combination lock to keep your valuables protected during transport. No one will be able to access what’s inside except your intended recipient.
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MULTIUSE FUNCTIONALITY: The contents cannot be revealed until the box is safely in the recipient’s hands, so you can feel secure in shipping jewelry, electronics, sensitive documents, and other high-value items.
(My emphasis, their words)
Someone’s going to some effort to try to tell us we can expect it to be Fort Knox.
Oh, look, it’s the manufacturer.
I think there’s some misleading advertising there.
It’s the covert tampering angle that is most baffling about this product:
While they may have picked an even worse lock than they could have, no ‘safe’ that can fit in a smallish FedEx box and still have room for contents(and not blow your weight limit) is going to resist physical attack for long; and the pick resistance of most locks is pretty tepid against a competent attacker with enough physical access that they don’t have to rush too much.
By contrast, there are a variety of flavors of glorified packing tape and/or stickers that wouldn’t last 30 seconds against a box cutter; but would be hell to non-destructively remove and then replace after stealing/tampering. There’s probably also a fair amount of room for fairly low cost improvement in this area: both just continuing to vary the adhesives and materials and things like using machine vision on before and after photos of the package to detect discrepancies.
If you are OK with the hassle of shipping restrictions on batteries (UN 3091 or UN 3481 aren’t the worst, they don’t trigger IATA "no goddamn way on passenger flights and we aren’t sure about cargo aircraft’ provisions in small quantities; but your carrier probably will charge you more); contemporary tech also gives you the option of larding the package with a cheap smartphone’s worth of sensors(and a modem to report back); plus the option of bags or tape with conductive traces or capacitive elements that detect cutting, and so on. Again, minimal resistance to someone who just wants to get in; but raises the bar considerably for a covert defeat(while also conveniently logging how gently the carrier is or isn’t handling the box, thermal excursions, etc.) and would probably cost less than this basic metal safe if manufactured in quantity.
Failure to deliver ironclad physical security under these size and weight constraints is understandable(though overselling the result as both secure and tamper evident isn’t); but that’s exactly why one would hope that they would stop bothering with a futile path and go nuts in tamper evidence mechanisms that might actually work instead.
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