You are correct, my apologies, I sometimes get LPS and MERS confused. The story is the same though. I recall that LPS’s forgery division was called DocX – they even had sample forged documents on their website to entice bank attorneys to use their services. They of course shut that all down once people started to become aware of what they were doing. For anyone interested in discovering more of the chicanery LPS gets up to here is a long quote from a nakedcapitalism piece on a lawsuit against LPS:
But the new and more troubling material is the mess LPS has made of bank records. LPS employees were given password controlled access to borrower payment records and could and did alter those accounts. These passwords were routinely and widely shared, in contravention of good practice. And since everything at LPS was organized around maximizing throughput rather than doing anything correctly, the errors were widespread:
LPS employees were rewarded for their speed, and this resulted in the violation of security protocols and significant and pervasive errors in the default services that they were providing (e.g., the application of mortgage payments to incorrect accounts). Even when these problems were discovered by the Company’s internal auditors, LPS swept them under the rug. Indeed, LPS knowingly concealed errors in files from clients, network attorneys, and courts to keep clients happy and to ensure that a finger could not be pointed at LPS.
Now consider the question of the integrity of borrower records. Because LPS was so casual about password control, a large number of employees could and did:
….access mortgage records of borrowers and alter them by changing entries, reversing transactions, adding transactions, and moving funds in and out of suspense accounts.
And the company was not terribly concerned about accuracy:
There was a huge volume of ledgers that had to be created and problems in loan files that had to be researched and unraveled by CW [Confidential Witness] 16 and his colleagues. These problems included, among others, missing payments, misapplied payments from other loan files, and payments that should have been attributed to other loans…
CW16 stated that they were “only allowed to look at an issue for two minutes, or five minutes tops.” His supervisors and managers did not want CW16 and his fellow employees to spend time on any loan unless it was incredibly complex. However, they frequently could not finish it within five minutes. According to CW16 “a lot of people didn’t understand the financial side and just winged it.
CW16 estimated that 20% of the motions for relief of stay (a filing to allow the bank to foreclose even though the borrower is in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy) were incorrect. This is markedly above the 10% level mentioned by the US Trustee in a Gretchen Morgenson article last weekend (although his comment could be read to allow for even higher rates).
If you think this is bad, the level of errors in borrower files is worse:
According to CW16, on top of the 20% of files with phantom referrals, approximately another 35% of files had some problems in them. Those problems varied, and included among others, an ARM that had improperly adjusted up, a failure to properly account for a borrower’s principal and interest payments, and a failure to properly attribute payments between pre-petition and post-petition that led the banks to try to collect pre-petition obligations they were not permitted to pursue.
Note that the nature of these errors is serious, and from what we’ve seen in various lawsuits and in the press, the numbers are often large, and that’s consistent with the US Trustee’s findings."
Read more at http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/05/former-lps-employees-allege-30-to-78-error-rate-in-borrower-mortgage-records-contradicting-bankerregulator-cover-up.html#ouZ0LAL1g2X2qsl2.99