As is often the case, Mr. Munroe has already proposed a solution to this problem.
It's not necessarily fair to say that this method works on "high-security locks." There are a number of high-security lock systems that are either very difficult to bump, or intrinsically impossible to bump, like Protecs.
The larger threat of 3D printing and precise computerized machining, however, is that key control becomes far more difficult. It no longer matters if only one company can make the key for your lock: anyone else with temporary access to your key can just print one. Outside of unusual things like EVVA MCS, I'm not sure how this can be prevented.
In general if anybody untrusted has access to a key for any length of time the key needs to be considered compromised. People were making wax impressions of keys back in the 17th century.
In general if anybody untrusted has access to a key for any length of time the key needs to be considered compromised.
You should probably amend this to
In general, if anybody untrusted has a photograph of a lock's keyway for any length of time, the lock, and any other lock using the same general type of keyway, needs to be considered compromised.
Or, more broadly: Keyed locks are a deterrent, but should never be considered as absolutely secure. And most things that are locked can be accessed by methods that do not require defeating the lock directly.
Nothing is secure given enough time and a determined attacker.
Must be a fan of the The Invisibles (Episode #1.4). (I wish they had made more.)
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