The only evidence you provided is:
Eight words (without any sort of supporting documentation) is not evidence.
Yeah, weāre not going to get into a Quid Pro Pro discussion, thatās insanely difficult to prove because the argument becomes āoh, they wouldāve been that reckless/awful to begin withā.
I will, however, briefly point out context of your āapperance of corruptionā comment. I will note first that this is specifically in the caveats section of a document that makes it clear that money does in fact buy influence.
Before we conclude, a few caveats are in order. We want to highlight that donation
patterns we have uncovered about how relevant industries respond to a loss of policy influence
(committee exile) creates an appearance of corruptionāthe key word being appearance.
Undertaking a search for āsmoking-gunā evidence of corruption is beyond the scope of this
study and a topic for future research. It is also worth noting that legislative access and a
contribution strategy designed to influence the legislative process in the short-term is neither
necessary nor sufficient to achieve actual changes in policy. While some questions and
ambiguities remain for investigation in future research, the evidence of short-term legislative
influence oriented contributions by savvy political elites election cycle after election cycle is
strongly suggestive of the notion that they are archiving some desired end.
Even if not explicit, the appearance of corruption undermines the publicās trust in
Congress. This is exacerbated by the distortions in the policy process that contributions
for short-term influence create. When legislators receive contributions in exchange for shortterm
influence, they prioritize the problems of corporations and PACs with sufficient funds
to make a contribution. The policy problems of less well-financed interests are therefore dis-
advantaged. Perhaps, then, it is not surprising that the public has such scorn for Congress.
Now, the rest of the conclusions section, which you read, right?
Together, our evidence makes the case that industries under the purview of the committee
use contributions to cultivate a short-term relationship with committee members and to seek
short-term influence over policy. Legislators who are exiled experience a sharp drop in contributions
from PACs overseen by their committee. Instead, policy-relevant PACs direct their
money towards legislators who can continue to provide influence over policyāmaintaining
the same contribution levels to minority party members who remain on the committee. And
policy-relevant PACs under the purview of the committee increase contributions to members
of the majority on the committee and provide an even larger increase to new members of the
committee from the majority party. Corporate interests bail on the exiled legislators. Partisan
PACs, in contrast, have an electoral motivation for contribution, bailing out legislators
who lose their influential committee assignments.
Our findings contribute new insights into the role of Partisan PACs in Congress. We
show that these PACs often soften the effects of minority party status. Leadership PACs
contribute to newly vulnerable members, in part helping to compensate for the loss of policy
influence that accompanies losing a committee seat. It also allows the party leaders to
demonstrate they are not singling exiles out for punishment after being removed from a
committee.
In contrast, business PAC contributions are consistent with a spot-market for short-term
policy influence. Policy-relevant PACs under the purview of the committee use contributions
to buy short-term access to influential legislators and then abandon those legislators when
they lose direct influence over the PACsā industry. Instead, PACs from industries overseen
by the committee direct their contributions towards legislators who maintain influence over
policy. While not explicit, contributions to obtain short-term influence create an appearance
of corruption. It appears that PACs and corporate interests use donations to solicit favors
and to change policy. In turn, members of Congress appear to require donations to be
attentive to problems.
PACs from industries under the domain of the committee do not, however, appear concerned
with cultivating long-term relationships with legislators. This may occur for several
reasons. Consistent with the spot-market for influence in Congress, legislators may be unable
to credibly commit to not accepting industry contributions once they return to power
(McCarty and Rothenberg, 1996). Without the ability to credibly commit to future sanctions,
PACs may feel comfortable bailing on legislators who are no longer on the committee.
This is particularly remarkable, because PACs planning for the long-term know that exiles
are first in line to return to the committee. In spite of this high likelihood of return, PACs
direct their money to the new members. Short-term legislative influence appears to be the
concerted goal.
So, money is used to buy access and influence to the political process. Are you implying otherwise?
That is what -I- am stating, and it is a very important part of the reason why people are pushing for a political process in which money is NOT a source of influence.
Do you approve of this? Do you disagree with the concept? Are you okay with said corruption (and the political appointees and ambassadors that are donorsā¦no money buying influence there, right?)
Please clarify Again. I am NOT discussing proven quid pro quo, I am discussing money being used to buy influence and power a regular citizen would not have, which is a complete violation of democracy.
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If you have a time machine you could have brought up that youād have liked me to fill that out when it was relevant, but alas, now I decline to discuss campaign finance and also meta-commentary of those discussions. I made my more relevant point, which was that while I was critical of you, that wasnāt an ad hominem. Iād exhort your to follow up on my initial exhortation, though.
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