I remember declining to watch a modern war film with a group of semi new friends because I’m staunchly opposed to that Hollywood Horse-ess propaganda… but for some reason I fall for it once the fancy costumes come out of the attic.
‘History is a set of lies agreed upon.’
Makes me think all forms of war film are fundamentally unethical because they rely so heavily on the emotional response of the audience which is divisive enough already.
Haven’t seen documentaries like the Act of Killing… but should warmongers be restricted to documentaries or history books alone?
Except maybe Come and See. Best, probably most accurate war film ever. Just an endless gut punch for about 2 hours. No glory, no victory, nothing shot in a way to make it beautiful… just blood, guts, muck, shit, piss, pain, told via the eyes of 15 year old boy.
People remember Chamberlain poorly for appeasing the Nazis. Well, Stalin was worse, making a pact with them and then refusing to believe they might break it. It’s the most dramatic of many examples showing he had the tenuous grip on political reality that most authoritarian thugs do. I have no idea what would make anyone would consider him a genius.
Genghis Khan…I don’t know. He was at least a capable enough leader to unite the steppe tribes and all that. I have no idea why anyone would consider him any kind of genius either, though. So I know he used the extremely good soldiers they had to kill a lot of people, provide his armies with a lot of loot to keep them happy, and terrorize a lot of countries into submission – that hardly says he’s more brilliant than any other mob leader, that’s how rampaging armies work so long as you keep them pointed outward. But I will admit I don’t know a lot of details, maybe there’s something more than “hey look, Khwarazm isn’t set up to fight off mounted nomads either, so let’s kill them too”.
Plus, we should also remember that what is a good strategy for a war has changed radically over the centuries. It’s a comparison that doesn’t make any sense at all, so I’m not sure why @Olympe_de_Gouges brought it up at all…
And that’s always what defines a “smart military strategist”, which is more core moral objecting to calling such things “genius”… it all rests on how the more effectively murder people. That’s the much easier path for making social change or getting what you want out of your enemy. But far too many people are of the mind that war is inevitable, primarily because they don’t have much imagination about what’s possible. Some attempt to scoff at the idea that we can have a world without war and a minimum amount of violence in general, but if we can imagine it, I’d argue it’s possible. Since I’ve got Ursala K. Le Guin on my side on that point, I’ll call that a win!
As usual, all great and thoughtful points, @chenille! I always appreciate your views here…
Thanks for asking! I brought it up because I didn’t understand whether you thought Napoleon was undeserving of the reputation as a strategic genius for reasons particular to Napoleon, or if you just didn’t believe any military leader could be described as such.
It appears that the answer is the latter, which I don’t happen to agree with but provides context to our disagreement. If you don’t think that kind of label can/should apply to anyone like Napoleon (or Ghengis Khan), then we’re just working from very different baseline understandings of what those concepts mean.
Cheers!
Well, mainly his rise to power to obtain complete control over one of the most powerful states of the 20th century. If you’re interested, there’s a recent biography from Oleg Khlevniuk that paints a bit more complete picture of Stalin than an authoritarian thug. Don’t get me wrong, I agree that he was that, but the way he was able to obtain and consolidate power had a lot to do with his opponents underestimating as just a thug.
Again, though, recognizing unique political or military brilliance doesn’t mean we are somehow required to ignore their usually outsized failures (much less their monstrous nature or the cost of their actions) as well, we should be clear on that.
A smidge more than that. As an initial matter, even if “all” he did was conquer the largest land empire in history, I’d argue that alone strongly suggests there was some level of brilliance at play there, i.e. promoting and managing brilliant commanders, absorbing tactics and personnel from the conquered, hell just the fundamental shift from steppe warfare to siege is incredibly impressive.
I do think, though, that viewing the Mongols as no more than a “rampaging army” is more than a bit reductive, and ignores the administrative state he created and and political maneuvering that he used to maintain the empire. If all those things together don’t qualify for a reasonably objective measurement of strategic genius, then similar to my comment above we may be working from an incompatible baseline.
The problem is, what primarily sets most of the “great men” who have been discussed in this thread apart is not particular strategic or political excellence but rather a willingness to discard the societal norms that provided boundaries in their particular time and place. That’s what (I believe it was @anon61221983) was getting at with her objection that ruthlessness should not be conflated with genius.
It’s not genius to break the social norms that reduced brutality against captured soldiers and civilians in war. It’s not genius to have your own political mentors and allies killed so you have a clear path to control. It’s base ruthlessness, which is distinct from genius.
It seems like you are equating effectiveness with genius, and other people are agreeing that he was effective but not that it was due to genius…
“Genius”, I think, is not a very well-defined category or quality anyway. So no wonder that @Olympe_de_Gouges is using it in a different meaning than some of the other posters here!
This seems an awfully reductive (and confusing) interpretation of what most reasonable people would consider to be Napoleon’s gift of strategy.
This view of the figures I named requires a pretty significant effort to avoid all the other aspects beyond simply having people killed, but if that’s the extent to which you believe these qualities exist I don’t care to argue about it.
Fair point. I would clarify that I’m using effectiveness as an illustration of the qualities I’m talking about. Napoleon’s military success illustrates his genius as a commander–I’m not sure that’s controversial, is it? These successes cannot be viewed in a vacuum of their moral cost, of course.
Just as shooting first against an unsuspecting target is “successful” in a gunfight isn’t a signifier of skill, starting a war on an unprepared enemy isn’t a sign of superior strategy. It’s a sign of superior aggression, which is not the same at all.
This is definitely a unique view of the Napoleonic wars, but I’m not sure would agree that Austerlitz (or Jena, or Friedland, etc) was won by “starting a war on an unprepared enemy.”
In any event, I’m a little confused about this notion of Napoleon that ignores his re-organization of the French economy and bureaucracy. It’s one thing to have been able to command field armies of that size with the skill he did, but to also have the administrative skills to organize, feed, and pay them while also reforming the bureaucracy of the First Republic is quite another. There seems to be a lot very generalized discussion of Napoleon that isn’t entirely based in specifics.
I most definitely understand being repelled by the results of Napoleon’s rule, however, and I also understand (even if I don’t agree with) the baseline presumption that no aggressive military leader or conqueror can or should be recognized for their skill.
Just as looking only at successes leads to bias.
If you’d like to discuss specifics, how about this one:
Not exactly evidence of superior strategic skill.
Which I explained in earlier posts - including why I think focusing on great men does a disservice to understanding history itself. The “great man” narrative history is a major distortion of what the past was actually like, and it ends up glorifying incredibly destructive events, and makes them seem inevitable.
I’m all for looking at what people did, and parsing the effective, from the not effective, and the toll people paid for that. The five year plans were in fact effective, but that doesn’t mean that they did not have a negative impact, too. An even-handed account will note both how extraordinary that part of Soviet history was, how it was not just the “genius” of Stalin that made it happen, but the grit and determination of the Soviet people (all power to the people), and just what the downsides of such rapid development was.
Kind of, but also if his leadership was effective, it was more people people bought in, embraced it, and did the work.
It’s an over-hyped term that obscures historical processes, from my own POV. The more we look at individuals as history makers, and dismiss the great mass people who made history happen, the further from the truth that we get…
So, you disagree with the great man theory, you’re no longer “reasonable”… as a historian, that’s a pretty bullshit argument. The shift away from glorifying war and great white men has done more for a better understanding of the past, I’d argue. Individuals are never the only historical agents… generally speaking it’s the mass of humanity that helps to move history forward. You’re welcome to disagree, but maybe lay off dismissing other viewpoints on that topic.
Sure, what would you like to discuss? It’s one of the greatest miscalculations and military disasters in history, endlessly fascinating! Kutuzov’s ability to maintain a disciplined retreat, especially after Borodino, was incredible, combined with a ruthless scorched earth policy that Napoleon didn’t anticipate. (another example of utter ruthlessness pairing with strategic brilliance to carry the day, rather than being conflated with)
What do you think? If Napoleon had chosen to simply burn Moscow and immediately withdraw in September rather than the five weeks he spent there, would they have been able to maintain order and the bulk of the army? He just didn’t anticipate Alexander’s willingness to surrender Moscow and then do…nothing instead of coming to terms, but after Borodino he still could have declared victory and withdrawn in good order, I think. An incomprehensibly terrible blunder.
It’s odd that you seem to believe that those (like me) who believe Napoleon was a historically brilliant commander somehow ignore 1812? As mentioned, it’s one, and probably the most studied campaigns in history, and any source that doesn’t acknowledge and discuss it would be a pretty significant outlier.
All that said, if your standard for recognizing a brilliant strategist includes a limitation that one never loses a battle and/or displays terrible judgment, we fundamentally disagree about that as well. Hannibal, Alexander the Great, Yamamoto, Julius Caesar, they all at one time or another suffered devastating defeats due to poor judgment, and I still believe it is reasonable to categorize them as brilliant military strategists.
I hear you. I understand your baseline, I simply disagree with your application.
I disagree that one needs to subscribe to your notion of the great man theory and/or “glorify” war in order to recognize the strategic brilliance of individuals like Napoleon. Our premises are simply not compatible in this regard, so I don’t think repeating ourselves ad nauseum or making personal snipes is going to clear anything up.
And no where did I argue that. But the reality is that you are arguing the very well accepted, mainstream understanding of history, and I’m not. I’m the one arguing against “common wisdom”, not you. Most people don’t read much academic history, so the fact that the “great man” theory still holds sway among most of the public is understandable.
which I’ve not been doing. But hey, if you’ve been doing that, I guess I’ve been ignoring that… so…
If your desire is to discuss anything other than Ridley Scott’s film Napoleon, it really would be wise to go start your own post, rather than co-opting this one.
The whole offensive was a blunder. It wasn’t how long he lingered at Moscow, it’s that he lost 3/4 of the army getting there.
The same reckless aggressiveness that caused his successes also ensured his greatest defeats. The category error is attributing that aggressiveness as skill (or genius) and creating a legend around it instead of examining the real history around it.