Juror fined $11,227 after googling ICE officer's peculiar uniform patch

boing
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I really wish that you would read this article, because the person who wrote it (Professor Paul F. Kirgis of St. John’s University Law School) is much more of an expert than I am.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1106189

If you would just read the abstract, that would give a much better idea of what I am arguing, or at least trying to.

Abstract: “A fundamental principle of the Anglo-American adjudicative system is that cases must be decided based solely on evidence formally admitted through trial procedures. A jury may not base its decision on information received outside of those formal procedures. Yet jurors bring to the jury room a wealth of education and experience received prior to their service and not subject to the formal rules of proof. That kind of worldly knowledge is a prerequisite to jury service; without a basic level of common knowledge, jurors could not understand the evidence put before them. Problems can arise, however, when jurors bring expertise that exceeds the common knowledge that we expect, and need, them to have. This prospect raises the problem of the expert juror. Especially today, in an evidentiary system remade to require greater scrutiny of expert testimony, courts must be aware of the possibility that jurors will inject unexamined expertise into deliberations, thus subverting the adversarial model of proof we depend on for decisional accuracy and legitimacy. This article examines the problem of juror expertise and suggests an approach for addressing the problem that focuses first on jury selection and second, in extreme cases, on post-verdict review.”

Note the fundamental principle mentioned at the beginning.
Note that jurors need common knowledge, but that is to understand the evidence put before them, not to bring their own evidence.
Note how the author views the possibility that a juror will inject unexamined expertise into deliberations.

I realize that this is a very esoteric topic, but I am not just inventing these concepts on my own out of nowhere. If you can find an article by an expert that says the opposite about the role of juries, I would be happy to read it.

Honestly, I have found this argument quite frustrating. I introduced that article, which lays out the essentials of my argument, around 50 posts ago and repeatedly asked people to refer to it, and yet I have been treated as though I completely invented this whole insane idea about the role of juries on my own out of nowhere. As though nobody has ever thought of or suggested such a thing before. Nobody else has introduced any other scholarly articles to say otherwise. None of us are experts of course, but there HAS been scholarship about the role of juries.

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The article you cite presents exactly the argument I am making. As I pointed out, the burden of ferreting out expert jurors that may hinder their case falls upon the attorneys. If a juror lies about expertise during jury selection, that falls on the juror. Otherwise, failure to tease out some kind of expert knowledge during jury selection is an error on the part of the attorney, not the juror. The prosecution and defense have their chance to make their case during the trial itself. They don’t get a chance (and shouldn’t get a chance) to argue their case further once the jury is deliberating. That’s foolish. To bring it back again to the OP, it wasn’t the juror who brought the patch into evidence - it was the prosecution when they showed the video of the ICE officer. Once that’s introduced, it fair game for the jury. The prosecution has no right to argue how they interpret it.

You’re frustrated? You’re trying to extend that article way past the boundaries that it is covering. That’s the frustrating part.

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You read the whole article? Including Page 44, where it says:

"One basic remedy for the problem of juror expertise is to instruct
the jurors not to discuss or rely on their background knowledge about
specialized matters.166 This is a simple and cost-effective way to offer at
least some protection from speculative juror expertise. But it cannot be
the sole measure taken, because, despite our systemic adherence to the
fiction that jurors follow instructions on how to use evidence, empirical
studies have established that jurors routinely rely on evidence they have
been instructed not to consider.167 Like a decision to rely solely on
peremptory challenges, a decision to rely solely on jury instructions
amounts to a decision not to regulate juror background knowledge at all.
Still, jury instructions are an important part of the total package of
safeguards, because they can, in at least some cases, minimize the damage
from speculative juror background knowledge and thus reduce the
incidence of overturned jury verdicts. As I will explain in proposing
remedial measures, a party should not be allowed to seek to overturn a
verdict unless it first requested a jury instruction that might have
prevented the misconduct. "

You made that point in your most recent post, not before. That is not the same as “am making.” To say that it is a point that you “are making” suggests that you have been making it consistently throughout, which you have not. Oh, also, the article does not say that at all. If the attorneys fail to ferret out expert jurors, they don’t then have to suck it up and live with consequences of the jurors they selected. That is not how our justice system works at all. The article is talking about ways of preventing mistrials, not saying that mistrials shouldn’t happen because the attorneys did not do a good job of selecting jurors.

The statement, “This patch is a white supremacist patch” IS evidence. The mere existence of the patch, the physical object (or a video thereof), is not the only thing that is considered to be evidence in a court of law.

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Here, by the way is an example from that article. @anon50609448 @DukeTrout

“A number of more recent Texas cases have also adopted that
restrictive position. In Deary v. Texas,
75 a 1984 case adopting perhaps the
most narrow view of permissible juror background knowledge possible,
the defendant was charged with shoplifting a cassette player. The price
tag on the player gave a price of $200 and the merchandising manager
testified that the player was worth $200, but there was some question as to
whether that price included speakers, which the defendant was not accused
of stealing. One of the jurors told the others that he had experience
shopping for stereo equipment and that he believed it was reasonable to
conclude that the cassette player alone cost $200. The defendant was
convicted. Without significant analysis, the Court of Appeals found that
this seemingly benign statement constituted the receipt by the jury of
“other evidence”—evidence other than that introduced at trial—and that it
was therefore juror misconduct warranting reversal.7”

So you see, you are not just arguing against my crazy ideas here. You are also arguing against the Court of Appeals in the Case of Deary v. Texas, though even the author admits that this is the most narrow view of permissible juror background knowledge possible. It is not just my own idea that I just made up right now. There is lots of past scholarship and precedent for this kind of thing that anyone could have looked up at any point during this argument. And from an article that I posted way back at the beginning of this argument.

Here are some more cases out of Texas:
Some of the older cases in which Texas courts
overturned jury verdicts include the following:
• In a railroad accident case, a juror who was a railroad fireman
contradicted testimony by witnesses that the track rails were
dry the night of the accident by telling the other jurors that
track rails are always wet at night.67

• In a wrongful death action based on the electrocution of a city
employed lineman, a juror who had been a lineman told the
other jurors that the deceased should have been working on the
line from below instead of from above, as he was when he was
electrocuted.68
• In an action to recover for defects in an automobile, a juror
with experience working with cars told the other jurors that if
the car had had the defects complained of, it would not have
run as long as it did.69
• In a criminal prosecution for illegal manufacture of liquor, a
juror who was a druggist told the other jurors that the
defendant’s claim that he was making vinegar was not
believable because alcohol could not be used to make vinegar
in the way the defendant claimed.70
• In an action to recover for defects in the construction of a
house, the jury disregarded the trial testimony on the cost of
repair and accepted instead the cost estimates made by a juror
who was a contractor.71

Here is a case from Washington:
“In Halverson v. Anderson,
84 the first reported
case addressing this subject, a minor injured in a car accident sought
damages for, among other things, lost earnings. Testimony at trial
indicated that the plaintiff hoped to be an airline pilot but was also
studying to be a civil surveyor. One of the jurors told the others that an
airline pilot would earn about $2,000 per month and a civil surveyor
would earn about $1,500 per month. The jurors relied on these numbers to
reach their verdict on future lost wages.
The Washington Supreme Court held that a new trial should be
granted. It concluded that the statements by the juror constituted the
introduction of “evidence which was not subject to objection, cross-examination, explanation or rebuttal” by the parties.85”

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For what it is worth I’m fairly certain I have seen multiple studies that this is very much an innate bias in people. It’s not about respect. It’s about self-awareness. Most people actually have this bias.

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Here is another gem from the article that you have already read in its entirety, and so can confidently say that I am stretching beyond its boundaries.

“Specialized knowledge poses the same risks to the truth-seeking objectives
of trial whether it enters the decision-making process through expert
testimony or through the back door of juror background knowledge. In
fact, the risks to accuracy may be less when expertise is offered by a
witness than when it is introduced by a juror, because the witness will be
subject to cross-examination and rebuttal. Flawed expertise brought to the
case by a juror is not subject to cross-examination or rebuttal, and in most
cases is entirely hidden from view. It thus poses special risks in criminal
cases—even beyond the threat to accuracy—because of criminal
defendants’ constitutional rights to be confronted with and to confront the
evidence against them.2”

And here, “Nevertheless, the lines must be drawn. Our adjudicative system
depends on the principle that cases be decided based solely on admitted
evidence.40 The data that forms the minor premises in the jurors’
inferences unquestionably constitutes evidence to which that principle
applies. Under Rule 606(b) and a long line of cases, jurors may not
investigate the facts of the case on their own, and their verdict may be
compromised if they learn about the facts of the case through avenues
“extraneous” to the evidentiary process.41 To the extent the background
knowledge that forms the major premises exceeds the bounds of common
knowledge, Daubert and its progeny make clear that it too must be
considered evidence and filtered through appropriate procedural rules.”

And “The risks posed by juror expertise are particularly troubling in
criminal cases. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to be
confronted by the evidence against him.62 And Daubert/Kumho and the
new Rule 702 make clear that special risks attend the introduction of
specialized knowledge into evidence. Given those facts, expertise offered
by a juror in a criminal case is doubly problematic: it cannot be screened
through the “gatekeeper” process and the defendant has no opportunity to
cross-examine it or even to be made aware of its existence. Criminal
defendants thus have profound reason for concern when expertise is
offered by a juror as a basis for drawing inferences against them.”

So I ask you, what is your motivation for arguing so passionately about a subject that you have not researched at all? Why have you not done your research into this? Were you aware of the constitutional right of the accused to confront evidence against him/her, for example? Are you arguing because you are smitten? This might be worth examining.

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I’ve served on several juries, unfortunately. It’s awful. The only cases that make it to trial are cases where the situation is ambiguous or emotional enough that no one will settle.

I am conceptually happy to participate in a justice system that has us being judged by people like us. Tall order in the US today - if you need an example of the horrifying degree of implicit bias and unexamined prejudice your “peers” carry around, go get yourself on a Jury.

And refereeing a Lawyer contest around Rape or Police Brutality like I did is traumatic. Its a week of theatrics designed to make you doubt everything everyone, including the survivors, is saying. You spend all that time getting fucked with and then have to sit there with a bunch of racists and decide several people’s fates.

Maybe some of you are emotionally sturdy enough to call that noble and fulfilling, but not me.

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And in fact, that’s the whole point of juries, as opposed to a bench trial, where one judge has to rule purely according to the law and cannot act like a ‘human’ in making the determination.

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I felt like what you were saying couldn’t be right because it was epistemological nonsense and would require jurors to delineate between acceptable and unacceptable knowledge which they are utterly unqualified to do. But I guess that we just me assuming I wouldn’t find the system to be madness, which is a weird thing for me to assume.

I’m trying to imagine myself in the shoes of that person who had recently shopped for stereos and finding out after the fact I’d cause a mistrial because a shopping trip imparted me with “specialist” knowledge which was not “common” knowledge and I guess I was supposed to know that? I get it, out there lots of lawyers would say, “You know what we mean,” but I truly don’t.

But hey, I’ve heard they don’t like jurors with philosophy degrees, and maybe this is the reason.

ETA: I checked with some Canadian lawyers I know and they confirmed that in Canada the example of the car or the stereo would never have resulted in a mistrial. So there really are jurisdictional differences at work in this discussion. I guess it’s all a good reminder to never argue over facts.

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I understand and share your concerns about the madness of the jury system in general. In a perfect world, the judge would give very explicit instructions to the jury about what they can and cannot do (which is one of the suggestions of the article I cited).

I also agree that the stereo example went too far, as the juror was only verifying information that had been presented in open court.

I think that there is a line when it comes to what a juror can tell other jurors that those jurors do not otherwise know, and I believe that that line should be clear and be made clear to jurors. We spent so much time talking about whether that line exists that we didn’t get to talk about where that line should be set, but I hope that we can one day have that discussion.

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Is there any chance that you might want to admit that you were wrong after being presented with actual and abundant evidence from a scholarly journal and actual court precedent completely contradicting everything that you were saying with such condescending confidence and without any research or knowledge of the subject matter?

Just wondering.

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Eh. That certainly did happen. But the entire justice system was tainted with bad actors: prosecutors either deliberately throwing cases or just using “discretion” to decline to prosecute, and judges making unjustifiable rulings and sentencing decisions. Focusing on jury nullification as the great evil seems shortsighted, especially given the documented role they had in not enforcing the odious pre-civil war federal laws about runaway slaves in the North. Those juries were effective to the point of the law being changed to avoid jury trials for these cases (see the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850).

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Yes. It did. In lived memory it did.

That’s not what I’m doing. I’m pointing out how it’s historically BEEN used, which, you know, matters.

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