Wasn’t saying it was.
Just pointing out that law professors are quite capable of espousing completely unrealistic and non-mainstream theories of jurisprudence.
Stating that someone couldn’t possibly think something is a statement of what the law is or should be is bound to fall foul of someone somewhere who does think just that - and requires his (usually his) students to agree with him.
I agree with you that Blackstone’s views were rather more nuanced than the OP quote implies.
This is entirely OT and going far too far for what was intended to simply be a throw-away joke about those wacky law professors but:
In my view Blackstone almost certainly did genuinely believe that property rights were “that sole and despotic dominion…” etc. He also argued that yes, the law does allow for limits on that dominion.
Those limits are those that society agrees upon:
III. THE third abfolute right, inherent in every Englifhman, is that of property which confifts in the free ufe, enjoyment, and difpofal of all his acquifitions, without any control or diminution, fave only by the laws of the land.
The original of private property is probably founded in nature, as will be more fully explained in the second book of the ensuing commentaries: but certainly the modifications under which we at present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society; and are some of those civil advantages, in exchange for which every individual has resigned a part of his natural liberty.
So great moreover is the regard of the law for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community. If a new road, for instance, were to be made through the grounds of a private person, it might perhaps be extensively beneficial to the public; but the law permits no man, or set of men, to do this without consent of the owner of the land. In vain may it be urged, that the good of the individual ought to yield to that of the community; for it would be dangerous to allow any private man, or even any public tribunal, to be the judge of this common good, and to decide whether it be expedient or no. Besides, the public good is in nothing more essentially interested, than in the protection of every individual’s private rights, as modelled by the municipal law. In this, and similar cases the legislature alone can, and indeed frequently does, interpose, and compel the individual to acquiesce. But how does it interpose and compel? Not by absolutely stripping the subject of his property in an arbitrary manner; but by giving him a full indemnification and equivalent for the injury thereby sustained. The public is now considered as an individual, treating with an individual for an exchange. All that the legislature does is to oblige the owner to alienate his possessions for a reasonable price; and even this is an exertion of power, which the legislature indulges with caution, and which nothing but the legislature can perform.
Interference with property rights is permissible by the consent of parliament which is the mechanism each person has agreed to in order to regulate society and minimise strife, etc.
That does not mean that Blackstone did not believe that without those by definition voluntary limits on dealings with property, ‘property’ did not give you the right to do as you wish with your property without interference from others.
I believe that is still the mainstream basis of property law.