This is the standard issue reminder that the sort of terrorists and criminals who you need to be worried about can trivially set up secure channels of documentation given that, you know, Rivest, Ronald L., Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. "A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems." Communications of the ACM 21, no. 2 (1978): 120-126. is publicly available, and has been for nearly forty years now. Not that they'll need to because you can find thoroughly tested implementations thereof available as open source.
The only people who'd be affected by this are (a) stupid criminals and (b) normal, law-abiding citizens whose privacy will be destroyed as any backdoor is first exploited by hackers and second is abused by government officials in the manner all such powers are always abused for ends both petty and monstrous. The governments of the world have demonstrated beyond a shadow of the doubt they are not fit to command the powers they have already, let alone fit to have their reach extended.