The pro-Ukrainian analyst @KofmanMichael explains in one of his podcasts that the issue of launching long-range missiles towards Russia is far more complex than how many commentators present it. Ukraine and its supporters are asking for much more than just permission for Ukraine to point its weapons wherever it wants: they are asking for a joint NATO-Ukraine operation, with NATO personnel involved in the attack campaign against Russia within Russia’s internationally recognized borders. Listen to Kofman, who is much more honest than many keyboard warriors:
Lastly, the issue of providing certain capabilities also comes down to weapons whose use will have to involve direct Western support. There’s intelligence support in their operations. A lot of people do not understand this in the third year of the war. They still do not understand this, that it would mean the United States and other countries in many cases being directly involved in targeting, planning, intelligence analysis, and various other forms of support for strikes into Russia. And maybe for some folks, this isn’t a big issue or maybe it’s a very minor threshold to cross, but it’s not their call. It’s up to the people responsible for making these decisions and dealing with the consequences of those actions to wrestle with them.
From my point of view, their main concerns aren’t about nuclear escalation but horizontal escalation. That is, Russians countering and retaliating by transferring technology, know-how, and specialized personnel to countries like Yemen, like the Houthis, to, say, enable the targeting of major maritime shipping. This wouldn’t just be a problem for the United States but also for basically everyone who relies on that commercial route. That would be an issue.
Another concern is the expanding Russian sabotage campaign in Europe and the trajectory it could take, which has been very notable over the past year. There could be worries about the future costs and actions Russia might take, whether conventional or mostly asymmetric. I hate that term because everything is asymmetric. But I think people get what I’m trying to say. I don’t mean that if the United States supports attacks in Russia, then Russia is going to start firing attacks into a NATO country… But I use the term to convey that there are other ways Russia can retaliate.
Now, someone could argue, “Hey, this is already happening and people shouldn’t be too concerned about it,” and I’d say that’s a perfectly valid point. I’m just trying to provide information and show how policymakers think about these issues in what is, in my view, a low-information discussion at the moment. From a cost-benefit perspective, those who want to cross a certain threshold need to be convinced that the benefits are worth it.
A red line is when you say “do this and we are going to declare war on you, period, even if it means mutual destruction”. NATO article 5 is an example. None of Putin’s lines have actually been red, as shown by the fact that he keeps having to make up new ones.
Okay, yellow lines then. Washable ones.
Russia and Ukraine exchange 206 prisoners
The incursions continue
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/09/15/backed-by-tanks-and-covered-by-glide-bombing-fighter-jets-ukrainian-troops-have-advanced-into-russia-along-a-new-axis/
Violent meatheads angry that a violent meathead acted like a violent meathead
Simon Jenkins is back, and he thinks that Putin thinks that the war is a mistake.
Why the hell does Guardian give that sniveling bootlicker of Putin’s bloodstained jackboots any space, again?
As with many sub-par columnists in the UK, the most likely answer is that he’s an old school chum of one of the senior editors.
