Neatly side-stepping the fact that western-made armour is designed to operate with air power parity (if not superiority).
I had to educate myself on what that actually is…
Doesn’t seem like a really great campfire addition. 
C4 burns fairly well and can (and has) been used as a flame source for brewing coffee in the field. Add a shockwave and you’ll ruin that coffee
Background:
Apart from what @timd said, it’s also worth pointing out that western armored vehicles have been doing their main task much better than what Russian gear does, and that is protecting the crew inside the vehicle, and rerouting damage so that repairs can be made. When a T-whatever is hit, the crew is often turned into aerosol and the turret attempts to achieve escape velocity, but even the Leopard 1 is designed that a hit to ammo will blow up and out, away from the crew. The Abrams and the Leo II are even more so compartmentalized.
Western gear has been doing excellent in its role of exploiting better night vision, protecting the crews and the infantry, and if it does encounter Russian armor it often can target and shoot long before the Russian tank can get within range to retaliate.
But the thing that is really making the Russians miserable? Counterbattery fire. Western howitzers and MLRS/HIMARS have been blasting Russian artillery to bits faster than they can replace it.
Isn’t it strange how all these ‘centrist kingmakers’ would rather caucus with fascists than the centre left 
Just like the Liberals in the Weimar Republic voted forHitler’s enabling act.
It’s absolutely in liberal, and Liberal, DNA.
Yeah, this was evident in the beginning, and then once more when we saw Russians laying fence minefields that are several kilometers deep. It’s amazing that they still have any in stock, though I suspect it’s one of the only things their industry can still crank out.
Russia is the poster child for banning land mines.
The article’s take seems a little weird in that the complaint seems perfectly plausible from the perspective of an operator, like Ukraine, that only gets a tiny number of units and has to deal with the fact that being really good at bullying T-72s with inadequately modernized optics doesn’t cross minefields or save you from artillery; but then claims a problem in design philosophy based on the experience of that operator stuck with far fewer than desired.
During the Gulf War, where the US had reason to expect more or less complete air superiority and some coalition support, there were 2,024 Abrams deployed and 1,089 in reserve, along with 1,730 Bradleys deployed and 470 in reserve. Numerically inferior to Iraqi armor; but absolutely not “these are super elite, so what could possibly go wrong?” deployment numbers.
None of that is any comfort to someone who gets handed 30 of them and then hassled about why the results are taking so long and(as with people discovering unpleasant facts about their actual munition production rates) there is probably good reason to suspect that keeping large numbers of Abrams in the field in the face of high intensity conflict would likely prove a lot harder, and expose more logistical weak spots and optimistic assumptions about available cost savings, than the optimistic assumption would have it; but the American use suggests only fairly modest assumptions about the value of quality over quantity(just a willingness to pay for both that isn’t readily transferrable).
Looks like Putin scores a win.
A shutdown would also be a win for Putin.
