PGP was OK back in the day before retention of server logs, State interference in ISPs and the like. Now we know that the NSA is using exploits to monitor computers, in which case PGP is useless (on The Register I used the analogy that while Alice and Bob may be using strong encryption to conceal what they are up to in the bathroom, it’s not much use if Carol is hiding in the bathroom cabinet, and a number of people are agreeing with me).
Kaspersky is being banned for federal workers in the US presumably because the Israelis have discovered that Kaspersky is collecting data about NSA exploits in the wild, and presumably adding countermeasures to their AV. So unless Kaspersky is banned, the NSA cannot monitor US citizens so easily. That shows how important Trojans have now become to the TLAs.
Meta-data just adds to the surveillance.
The bottom line is that we are in what John Le Carré calls “Moscow rules” in his books - it is not really possible to use electronic means of communication for anything you don’t want the State to know about. (In his book The Russia House, the CIA wires up the British agent and break the Moscow Rules, resulting in his exposure).