To be fair on the Soviet Union they beat the Nazis in a tank battle in Kursk which doomed Nazi Germany (no access to oil), and there is now way of spinning that as US tanks.
Because they were shite. Tommy cookers as the Germans called them.
I suspect that the joke refers more to the other lend lease materiel sent to Russia: trucks, food, aircraft, clothing, etc.
Ukrainian tactics in Kursk according to Russian milblogger Two Majors.
He says that Ukraine knows the mixed nature of forces attempting to stop them and they’re taking advantage of that. Small groups push into areas between Russian formations, make their presence known and wait to see how Russia responds.
If Russia sends in a large force, the Ukrainians withdraw or shift left or right to avoid a major confrontation and test out a new axis of advance. However, if few or no Russian forces respond, they move a reserve element forward to further defend this new terrain.
In essence, Ukraine is continuously probing for gaps. When they find one, they’re exploited and we see forward progress by Ukrainian forces. Two Majors says this is a problem as there are communications issues between Russian units so it’s not always clear who is responding to the nearest threat and with what capabilities. This has allowed Ukraine to continue advancing even as more Russian forces deploy to Kursk.
Edit: the transformers were in a substation near Kursk NPP, not necessarily at Kursk NPP itself.
Kursk Nuclear Power Plant isn’t far from there, and there’s a 750 kV substation at Kursk. The Transformers at near Kursk NPP were hit by drones a day or so before the raid, IIRC.
Kursk substation is on a major transmission line connecting to Gubkinskaya, where an oil depot was hit by drones a week ago.
(click to embiggen)
Legend:
Lend Lease Studebaker trucks made the Red Army mobile and mechanized while the Nazi infantry were still primarily horse driven.
Upcycling refugees into either less-pesky new residents of occupied territory, or human shields for it, as the situation dictates sounds like something that could well be deliberate rather than being abject disorganization.
IIRC something like 100,000 Russians have moved to Crimea since 2014, so the need for “less-pesky new residents” is well provided for. Bringing internally displaced people to Crimea is daft right now, not only because of the risk of missile and drone attacks but because transport connections are fragile. The repaired Crimean Bridge has limited capacity, and Ukraine has managed to take out some of the roll-on roll-off ships that would be needed to carry civilian traffic if the bridge were struck again.
The Ukrainian offensive in Kursk has been ongoing for 12 days and it is time to make an intermediate assessment on all levels. Spoiler: it is an Ukrainian success story. Please indulge me.
When in the morning hours of August 6, 2024, the first news hit that Russian border posts in Kursk were struck, not many could imagine the scale of what was going on. Many had the small cross border raids in mind from last year when the Free Russian Legion was entering Belgorod and harassing a few border villages, but obviously that was not the case here. In order to summarize it properly, I will try to shed light on this on all relevant levels, tactical, operational, strategic and political.
Tactical Level
On the tactical level Russians were completely unprepared of what was coming. The border posts such as in Oleshnya were quickly overrun and the Russian conscripts in their posts surrendered fast. The initial response units of the Russian army were all but wiped out and even an Kamov Ka-52 chopper, which tried to interfere, was shot out of the sky.
The Ukrainian strikes were coordinated on an extremely professional level, using artillery, tanks, armored vehicles, drones and other aerial vehicles. Communication and tactics showed that Ukrainian forces mastered what is commonly known as maneuver warfare. At no stage in this war Russians ever employed this kind of professionalism. In addition, the discipline among Ukrainian soldiers not to use mobile phones and disclose communication as well as gains in territory left Russians (and the OSINT community) relatively in the dark. The Ukrainian silence in preparation and execution of this operation might be the most astounding factor in this campaign. It almost flawlessly worked.
Operational Level
Aside from the tactical cleverness Ukrainians showed to us so far, it was and still is also the way they moved into the Kursk region. While Russian forces are infamous in trying to reach and overcome heavily fortified cities, towns and villages, Ukrainians rather bypassed larger settlements, cut and intercept the rear and encircle Russian troop concentrations, and by doing so staying even more in the shadows. This probably enabled the capture of large numbers of Russian POWs who found themselves quickly behind lines. Estimations go as high as 2,000 Russian soldiers being captured, an number so high that it might even be a strain for Ukrainian logistics. But it is obvious that this alone has already made the operation worthwhile.
Russians, however, employed the same mistakes they made when starting the full-scale war back in February 2022. Some large columns which were mustered, were not only detected by Ukrainian forces, but as with the instance in Rylsk completely destroyed. This single event made an already difficult situation for Russian forces worse. It might turn out that this single event will be responsible for vast losses in territory, starting with Korenevo, which at this very hours is getting pounded and encircled. Overall, the whole Russian operational situation shows that they are only trying to stem the tide, without any short-term hope of dislodging the enemy. The Ukrainian Blitz has been an operational success, despite Russian resistance in some areas.
Strategic Level
Any tactical and operational planning and especially execution should follow an overarching strategy. We saw this when Ukrainian forces were successfully defeating Russian forces in Kyiv and the North in March 2022, and even more so when vast areas in Kharkiv and Kherson regions were liberated. Russians, on the other hand, lack a strategy. Other than trying to atrit the enemy, there is nothing what really resemblance a strategy, and this one is a questionable one for sure. The huge casualties in Bakhmut, Vuhledar and Avdiivka, where hundreds of thousands of Russians were destroyed, either by KIA or permanently WIA, didn’t yield any strategic gain, neither in terms of territory nor in trying to disable the Ukrainian army altogether. It is obvious that the Kremlin was trying to perpetuate the illusion that Russia can do this forever. And this has been the Russian strategy ever since, combined with projecting “red lines” which aim to stop or at least slow down Western aid for Ukraine, in hope to force Ukrainians into a diktat peace which Putin could sell to his subjects.
Ukraine could never allow itself to do the same for both, military and also humanitarian reasons. Since sending out countless of meat waves was never a lasting solution for Ukraine, the counter offensive in the South in 2023 got stuck, despite some notable successes in the Russian rear, especially in Crimea. It was clear that Russia and its lesser minions in the West would exploit this, but it was preferable to preserve the strength, rather than losing men for some fields in the south. A different approach was needed.
The choice to attack Russian lands in Kursk, which were not well defended and even less expected by Moscow, made it an ideal target. And the successes speak for themselves. Ukrainian forces have achieved in 7 days more territorial gains than Russians in one year of attrition warfare in Donetsk. The best part is that this was achieved with minimal own casualties. Yes, there were some losses, especially with MRAPs and Russians will celebrate every one of them, but considering that Ukraine has thousands of them its armory and the Wests tens of thousands ready, it is not a serious concern.
When playing the long game, it is imperative to use its forces and reserves in a most efficient way, targeting weak spots and force the enemy to lose more troops and driving them beyond capacity. In fact, Russia was wasting huge amounts of human material and hardware against what was a Maginot line in Donbas. Anyone who studied the history of wars knows that fortresses and defense lines are meant to be attacked, which should be actually a no-brainer. The trick is to bypass them and in doing so make them useless. Only when it is unavoidable you attack them.
When German forces were bypassing the Maginot line in 1940, huge amount of French military investments evaporated. Later in the Africa campaign both, German and British forces understood that supplies and logistics outweigh any territorial gains. If you can use the vastness of the territory to weaken your enemy, then it would be foolish not to do so. You should assume that Russians understand at least this from their own history, but it is almost comical that in Ukraine Putin and his entourage completely disregarded that. You might assume that his resulted from their hubris and I’m sure that their arrogance did their part. However, when seeing how atrociously bad Russians operate in combined arms warfare, it is explainable why they chose this bad option, because they are simply not capable of doing it differently.
Summarizing, you can only conclude that the Ukraine strategy is working. The breakthrough in Donetsk has been prevented. The Russian gains are small, even dwarfed by the Ukrainian gains in Kursk, which are still ongoing, and the Russian gains came for a horrifically high price. To call this pyrrhic, does not do the term justice, because even pyrrhic victory bears the term “victory”. Russians are nowhere near to achieve even that and Ukrainian forces might cause far more damage in Kursk, if Russians are not relocating more troops to this sector, effectively dashing what they intended in Donbas.
Political Level
The political implications might be even the most disastrous for the Russian war effort. Having Ukrainians firmly entrenched in Russian lands bodes not well from a military point of view in itself, but the picture it projects is far worse than anything what Russians have experienced so far. Putin was so devoted to project that Russia is “strong again”. He and his propaganda channels are going to great length to portray the 1990s and democracy as rule of weakness and in contrast him and his dictatorship the rule of strength and stability.
Having this defeat in Kursk under his watch where Russia had to concede to a foreign force territory and allow them take permanent hold of Russian lands, is a situation which has never occured since 1945, not even during the 1990s. Ukrainian conquest of Russian territories are the latest signs, how weak Russia in fact is. When reflecting that the whole Russian economy has been relegated to sustain this war, it makes this embarrassment even more embarrassing. Russia is devoted to this war and cannot even hold the own borders, basically adding insult to injury. That will stick and not even Russia’s propaganda channels are capable of fending this off.
Putin’s meek response speaks louder than anything else. The emperor’s new clothes are exposed once again and he is more afraid than ever. Russia is vulnerable and it cannot be hidden anymore. Ukrainian forces firmly control the border areas in Kursk and god knows how many reserves are waiting for this or even another incursion. Even when it would be possible to stop the Ukrainian advance, it is unlikely to dislodge them before the end of this year, if ever during this war.
This is extremely important to point out. Putin was already preparing to arm twist Ukraine into a diktat ceasefire. All what he needed is a steady even when slow advance in Donbas and Western governments in buying that he is going to sacrifice whatever is necessary. It was absolutely imperative for him to deny Ukrainians any kind of territorial successes. This was more important to him than his horrific losses, because he thought that he will reach a suitable point before his reserves are spent. This was emphasized when he and his lesser minions were always pointing out that Russia is advancing, ignoring that those advances are minuscule.
With Ukrainians in Kursk, on Russian lands, this has shifted, dramatically. He cannot even think of ceasefire as long as Ukrainians control even an inch of Russia, but his problems are that he will need another hugely costly campaign, similar to what is going on since 2 years in Donbas, without even a sight of end. Russia already squandered huge amounts of human material and hardware and we all know that his reserves are burning down. Depending on analysts, the Soviet reserves are spent by 2026-2027.
Russia cannot sustain this war forever, and Putin cannot allow Ukrainians on Russian lands. The planners in Kyiv skillfully recognized this and maneuvered Putin into a corner where his demise is expedited. They also exposed Russian weaknesses and presented their Western backers that Ukraine can win this war, if the weapons and ammunition are guaranteed. The West should take note of this success and draw the right conclusions. There are no Russian red lines, only bluffs. German-made tanks are in Russia, destroying Russians and we are all here. The bluff is called.
This war can be ended quickly, either militarily or with a decisive Russian defeat, which will cause a political change inside Russia. The Kursk operation has laid this completely open and it is time to do some serious action in the West, in order to break Putin-Russia’s neck once and for all.
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