That might be out of a desire to avoid inadvertently helping Russian intelligence to interpret the documents. Thomas Theiner claims that the documents contain details that Russian analysts would miss unless they get pointed in the right direction.
The standard story from which both the policymakers and the scholars begin is that of European nation-states learning a lesson from the Second World War: war is bad; peace is good; trade is pacifying. This is very appealing, but it is not true. The historical trajectory is actually this: European empires lose wars; and after the Second World War, best understood as a German defeat in an imperial war, they begin a process of European integration that overlaps with (and distracts from, and compensates for) imperial defeat and decline.
Seeing matters this way (as Tony Judt did in his Postwar ) has the advantage of opening European history to world history, since part of the appeal of the standard story is that it allows Europeans to forget the imperial past. It also sets the Russo-Ukrainian war in a context that is easier to understand: another imperial war, where the defeat of the imperial power is a necessary condition for continued European integration. The actual question in European politics has been empire or integration, and this has been true for decades; the Russian invasion of Ukraine brings this to light. Russia’s invasion is obviously a colonial war; juxtaposing it with others helps us to understand it and think through the proper response.
Once recognized, this basic historical truth should alter policy discussions. Trade might be pacifying, but the European example is of trade among defeated empires (in particular a defeated Germany). The defeat is part of the story not to be overlooked. In general, defeat (not peace) is the relevant category; it was not peace that happened Germans in 1945 or the Dutch in 1949 or the French in 1962, but defeat. We also see that the stakes of this war for the European project are as high as can be. Finally, we recognize that Ukraine resistance cannot be understood only in national categories, as we tend to do, but also in the broader categories of anti-colonialism and European integration.
https://twitter.com/oryxspioenkop/status/1644659476249686016
Volodymyr Zelenskiy shared Iftar with Ukrainian Muslim soldiers observing Ramadan on Friday, in what he said would become an annual “new tradition of respect”.
The Ukrainian leader said he participated in the first “official” Iftar alongside representatives of the Muslim clergy and leaders of the Mejlis, the single highest executive-representative body of the Crimean Tatars.
Addressing participants at the dinner, Zelenskiy said “we affirm that Ukraine values every person, values every community”, adding that “diversity is part of Ukraine’s character”.
So, something good could come out of this stupid war. A better recognition of the value of people, regardless.
The meaning of the sledgehammer:
There’s also a strategic element, given that Crimea could go back to Ukraine when this is over. Showing respect to long-term inhabitants who’ve been poorly treated by the Russian authorities since 2014 is an easy call.
Dmitry Medvedev, former Russian prime minister and president seat-warmer, is having a normal one.
If you’re wondering why Russia invaded Ukraine despite not needing it, the answer is that the bits Russia wants are not Ukraine.
Medvedev still can’t believe that the Poles aren’t itching to carve up Ukraine too. Perhaps he was hoping for a deal, like the one that can’t be mentioned.
Would Brazil relinquish claims to the Brazilian Island, and Artigas?
Ah, a “Banda Oriental”. Fortunately no one else remembers this and no one takes these claims very seriously. Well, I hope.
ETA
Could you imagine waging war for such tiny pieces of land? Two or three broken armies fighting with Vietnam War era weapons…
We really need a facepalm reaction option. Ye Gods!
It is likely that at least some changes to attitudes toward guns may be temporary, with some people seeing more permissive policies as an adjustment to wartime necessities rather than a desirable permanent outcome.
However, together with other surveys, our results do indicate that gun liberalization is likely to represent a long-term source of debate in Ukrainian society even after the war, with many if not most Ukrainians now seeing guns as normal and desirable, and a narrow majority now supporting liberalized policies, including for handguns.
All it takes is for one side to make a mistake, and the other to respond in error. And we are dealing with humans here, so…