shot down a 
Shahed drone this morning. Although many drones have crossed through this is the first time they’ve taken one out. It might be a bit thin to read much into, could be the drone was about to crash anyway, but it’s a mark on the “staying out of it” side of the card, IMO.
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There could be a lesson there about how militaries run by machismo are actually terribly ineffective, except the people who don’t already know that are the ones dedicated to not learning.
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A post by Russian political blogger Anatoly Nesmiyan about the damage to the Russian oil industry inflicted by Ukrainian UAV strikes on oil depots and refineries:
“Kyiv’s strikes on oil storage facilities have two dimensions. The operational dimension - the fires burn fuel that has already been produced and could have been used - either in the economy or for military needs. But there is also a strategic dimension.
Storage facilities are an integral part of the production chain, and if storage capacity is reduced, then production must also be reduced - finished products need to be stored somewhere.
Although fuel storage facilities themselves are not a very complex technology, and if desired can be built quite quickly, if we are talking about long-term storage facilities, these complexes take years to build.
Starting with the design, land allocation and ending with the creation of logistics for the delivery and collection of finished products. Infrastructure is the basis of normal economic activity, and it is precisely this that is being struck now.
It is worth saying that the results are already clearly there - information on the production and processing of oil products is suddenly classified.
The explanation ‘to prevent manipulation on the market‘ looks so-so. But as an attempt to hide the real damage from the strikes is more likely. But even from the information that is not yet classified, it is clear that the production of petroleum products has dropped quite significantly - by almost 10 percent.
The surplus of petroleum products was exported and was a kind of maneuvering fund. In the event of a fuel shortage within the country, exports could always be “cut.” And this maneuvering fund constituted approximately 10-12 percent of the total output. It turns out that today fuel consumption is proceeding without such a reserve, practically from the wheels.
It is clear what this threatens - in the event of a sudden need for a sharp increase in fuel consumption, a deficit will arise. This means another crisis in a series of endless others. And which will again have to be resolved by manual control.”
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Who could have predicted that torturing Muslim prisoners would radicalise them?
I wanted to share a few thoughts, offering a snapshot of the current situation in general, and discuss a few key points.
The situation in Pokrovsk is indeed severe but far from hopeless. Ukrainian command has the resources needed for stabilization, though this will require difficult and potentially unpopular decisions.
Resource shortages stem from both internal and external factors. Internally, issues include delayed mobilization, an ineffective recruitment process, an awful commanding culture, and the government’s struggle to balance public opinion with necessary measures. Externally, delays in Western aid, persistent restrictions on weapon use, insufficient military production ramp-up, and slow aid delivery contribute to the problem.
The issues in Pokrovsk are not new. Delayed aid from the U.S., hindered by an isolationist faction in the US Congress, made the fall of Avdiivka easier for Russian forces. This was exacerbated by inadequate defenses behind Avdiivka, which Ukrainian leadership chose to overlook, shifting responsibility to already overstretched and undermanned brigades.
The situation in Pokrovsk worsened with the Kursk offensive operation, which diverted experienced and motivated brigades, stripping stabilization reserves and allowing Russian forces to advance rapidly. This also echoes back to Bakhmut, where the decision to reinforce the semi-encircled city with experienced troops, instead of opting for a timely withdrawal, resulted in the loss of many skilled soldiers and officers, weakening the backbone of several effective units
Western sanctions on Russia were never fully enforced, enabling Russia to maintain and even expand its pre-war military production. This leniency suggests that some Western countries left a “backdoor” open for a post-war return, allowing Russia to significantly increase military recruitment payouts without the anticipated economic collapse
Russia is more formidable than many pro-Ukrainian analysts suggest but weaker than the pro-Russian camp portrays. Russia does not have unlimited resources: whether in terms of personnel, budget, or societal support. While it can be defeated, this will not happen if Ukraine and its Western partners continue to make the same mistakes.
Mistakes can be mitigated by an abundance of resources. Russia’s ability to sustain the war despite its failures is largely due to its resource advantages. Unfortunately, Ukraine lacks similar resources, and the West is less inclined to bear the cost of these mistakes by Ukraine, even if this will become more costly for the West in the future.
Despite the propaganda, Ukraine faces one of the most capable militaries in the world. Historical comparisons to the Russian army of the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries reveal striking similarities, yet these armies won numerous large-scale wars. The achievements of Ukrainian soldiers on the ground should not be belittled
Russia has failed to achieve its strategic objective thus far - overthrowing the government in Kyiv and turning Ukraine into a pro-Russian state. The war has been far less favorable for Russia than anticipated, and despite all its efforts, anything short of a complete occupation will not bring Ukraine back into its sphere of influence.
Sooner or later, discussions about negotiations and a “frozen conflict” will resurface in the media again, suggesting that a post-war Ukraine with minimal foreign military aid and no security guarantees is preferable to the current situation. In reality, this will give Russia a significant advantage, allowing it to prepare for a potentially more successful invasion.
If the West genuinely wants this war to end soon, now is the best time to provide Ukraine with the support it needs to gain a strong negotiating position. Forcing Ukraine into negotiations without such an advantage won’t succeed, just as Minsk I and Minsk II ultimately failed
After all, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to defy the odds and achieve victories - whether in the defense of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy, the counteroffensive in Kharkiv, or the liberation of Kherson. Successful strikes on Russian targets deep within its territory, significant damage to the Black Sea Fleet, and inflicting hundreds of thousands of casualties is not something that people thought in January of 2022
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updated
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